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The enthusiasm in official circles for Tribunals to settle inter-state river water disputes has not 
been matched by that of the states involved in the disputes. There is some doubt about whether 
the awards of the Tribunals dealing with the more difficult tasks will be accepted by the states. 
This throws up a rather fundamental question: What role, if any, can Tribunals play in resolving 
inter-state river water disputes in India? In order to answer this question, we first seek an 
appropriate concept of institutions that would help us understand Tribunals. Based on this 
concept, we would look at the abstract case for Tribunals. We would then go on to look at the 
issues that emerge in practice, before finally going on to argue that while the Tribunals have an 
essential role to play in addressing the technical and judicial aspects of inter-state river water 
disputes, there are other dimensions to these disputes that are equally important to address. 
Unfortunately, these fall well beyond the capabilities of even the best equipped Tribunal. Thus 
thee effectiveness of a Tribunal depends not just on what it does, but also on what is done to 
address factors beyond its control. 
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anonymous reviewer for very useful comments. None of them are, of course, responsible for the 
errors that still remain. 
National governments in India have tended to rely quite heavily on Tribunals to determine the 
sharing of river waters between states of the Union. Disputes concerning the waters of 
Narmada, Godavari, Krishna, Cauvery, Ravi and Beas rivers have all been referred to Tribunals.2 
The response of state governments to the awards of these Tribunals has however been rather 
uneven. In some cases, the verdicts of the Tribunals were accepted without too much 
resistance by the states concerned. In the case of the Godavari, the affected states even 
worked out a series of agreements leaving the Godavari Water Disputes Tribunal with the less 
onerous task of incorporating these results into its final report. On the other hand, in some 
other river basins, the contending parties have proved more difficult to please. Not only have 
they been far less capable of settling the disputes themselves but also they were not entirely 
willing to accept the awards of the relevant Tribunals. Indeed, Karnataka’s rejection of the 
interim order of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal in 1991 was accompanied by violent 
protests (Sebastian, 1992). There is thus a disparity between the enthusiasm in some official 
circles for Tribunals between the institutions with the knowledge and authority to resolve inter-
state water disputes and the doubts sometimes expressed by states over the validity of a 
Tribunal’s orders. This divergence brings to the fore a rather basic question: What role, if any, 
can Tribunals play in resolving inter-state river water disputes in India? 
In order to answer this question we first seek an appropriate concept of institutions that would 
help us understand Tribunals. Based on this concept, we would look at the abstract case for 
Tribunals. We would then go on to look at the issues that emerge in practice, before finally 
identifying some of the essential features of an effective mechanism to address river water 
disputes and the role of Tribunals in that mechanism.  
Institutions and River Water Dispute Tribunals 
In choosing a concept of institutions to understand the nature and functioning of River Water 
Dispute Tribunals, we run the risk of our choice being equipped to deal with only a part of the 
many dimensions of this issue. Too often, we take a rather narrow view of an institution as one 
that sets the rules that must then be unquestioningly followed. While the fairness of these rules 
may be debated in an academic, even abstract sense, the possibility of a rule that is believed to 
be fair in terms of accepted academic criteria not being considered fair by people in the 
contending states is not given too much importance. It is implicitly, and sometimes even 
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explicitly, assumed in academic discussions that once a Tribunal has considered all the facts and 
come up with an award, the state must quite simply use all the resources at its command to 
implement it. Any attempt to take into account emotional reactions on the ground would be 
seen as a sign of weakness.  
This tendency is reflected in some academic responses to Karnataka’s rejection of interim order 
of the Cauvery River Water Disputes Tribunal in 1991. Confronted by Karnataka’s actions, Tamil 
Nadu had asked for a direction from the Supreme Court that the order be implemented. But 
wary of the possibility that the Supreme Court’s order too could be difficult to implement in the 
emotionally charged environment at the time, the concerned states reached a short-term 
compromise which involved Tamil Nadu withdrawing its petition. The politicians’ recognition of 
the need to keep down the temperatures of the debate was not shared by at least one 
administrator/academic commentator who believed “an opportunity for an authoritative 
pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the question whether compliance with the award of 
an ISWD Tribunal is mandatory or not was missed” (Iyer, 2002).  
This approach has the advantage of logical clarity, as it does not have to take into account the 
often inconsistent and apparently unrelated claims that political reactions tend to bring into the 
picture. But the extent to which the politicians reflect perceptions of the dispute among the 
affected people keeping their reactions out, amounts to going by what is officially considered 
fair rather than what is seen to be fair. And if disputes and their intensity are determined by 
what is seen to be unfair, leaving out perceptions of unfairness will not help. Since disputes only 
disappear when the affected parties accept a proposed solution, we could argue that the 
success of a Tribunal should be measured not just in terms of its award being just, but also on it 
being seen to be just. A concept of institutions that would help us understand the nature and 
functioning of river water dispute Tribunals in India must then recognise that there could 
sometimes be a substantial divergence between what a Tribunal genuinely believes to be fair 
and what people in the contending states consider fair. 
One concept of institutions that meets this requirement is that used by John Rawls in A Theory 
of Justice. Rawls makes a distinction between two ways of perceiving an institution: “first as an 
abstract object, that is, as a possible form of conduct expressed by a system of rules; and 
second, as the realization in the thought and conduct of certain persons at a certain time and 
place of the actions specified by these rules. . . The institution as an abstract object is just or 
unjust in the sense that any realization of it would be just or unjust”(Rawls, 2000). Clearly, the 
academic and legal debate on water Tribunals tends to focus almost exclusively on the first way 
of looking at institutions, that is, the creation of a set of rules for water sharing. The focus of 
the politicians, on the other hand, is almost entirely on the second way of looking at 
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institutions, that is, the consequences of implementing the rules of water sharing laid down by 
the Tribunals. And, as this concept makes clear, it is the realization in practice of an institution 
that determines whether it is just or unjust, we cannot afford to leave out the responses to the 
actions of a Tribunal.  
To get a more inclusive picture of the role water Tribunals can play, we would need to go 
beyond looking at this institution as one that makes the rules of water sharing, in trying to 
understand the determinants of the reactions to its actions.  
The Rule Maker 
In a purely legal sense, water Tribunals owe their existence to the decision of the framers of the 
Indian constitution to make water the responsibility of state governments. When distributing 
subjects according to whether they should be dealt with by the states, the union or 
concurrently by both, water was placed on the state list. This created a need for a mechanism 
that would deal with disputes between states. The scope to create such a mechanism was 
provided by Article 262 of the Indian Constitution which states: 
“Adjudication of disputes relating to waters of inter-state rivers or river-valleys: 
1. Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with 
respect to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter-state river or 
river valley. 
2. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may, by law, provide that 
neither the Supreme Court, nor any other court, shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of 
any such dispute or complaint as is referred to in clause 1.” (Bakshi, 2005) 
Based on this Article, the Indian Parliament enacted the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 
1956.3 Three aspects of this Act stood out in its approach to river water disputes. First, it was 
true to the spirit of the Constitution, in that it upheld the view that water was a state subject. 
As such, it saw a role for Tribunals only at the request of an affected state. Second, it sought to 
merge the skills and reputation of the judiciary with the detailed investigation required to 
appreciate the intricacies of inter-state river water disputes. Thus its chairman and members 
had to be judges of the Supreme Court or a High Court at the time of their nomination, even as 
they were given sufficient time to investigate the matters referred to it. And third, there was no 
room for doubts about the stature of the Tribunal and its awards as the Act reiterated the 
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provision of Section 262 that neither the Supreme Court nor any other court would have any 
jurisdiction over any water dispute referred to the Tribunal under this Act.4  
The Act seemed to work well enough in the first three and a half decades of its existence. The 
Narmada Tribunal submitted its report in December 1979 and the Godavari Tribunal in July 
1980 and both found the required degree of acceptance by the affected states (Iyer, 1994). 
Since the 1980s however, there have been signs of the water disputes becoming much more 
politicised, with the dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu over Cauvery waters being a 
prime example. This tends to make states less accommodating towards Tribunals. The public 
perception of the Tribunals in individual states is that of central institutions which do not 
necessarily have that state’s interests at heart. And in this charged atmosphere, there are 
bound to be doubts about whether the verdicts of the Tribunals would be accepted by the state 
governments.  
The official response to this challenge has largely been in terms of trying to improve the 
efficiency of the Tribunals. The problems were seen as one of long delays before a Tribunal’s 
verdict was available and then the difficulties in enforcing that verdict. The Sarkaria 
Commission on Centre / State relations addressed both these concerns.5 It recommended 
deadlines at various stages in the entire process. It sought a one-year limit for the Union 
government to constitute a Tribunal once it received an application from a state. It also wanted 
the award to become effective within five years from the date of constitution of the Tribunal, 
though it was realistic enough to allow for the government to accede to the request of the 
Tribunal for an extension. And, in order to speed up the entire process of investigation, it made 
a case for a Data Bank and information system at the national level. To help make the award 
binding, it demanded that the awards of the Tribunal be given the same force and sanction as 
an order or decree of the Supreme Court. It was also inclined to curb the power of the states by 
allowing the Union government to appoint a Tribunal suo moto, without waiting for one of the 
affected states to approach it. 
Not surprisingly, when the recommendations were considered by a sub-committee of the inter-
state council, the attempt to give the Union government suo moto powers was struck down. 
But for the basic approach of setting deadlines and providing the Tribunal’s award, a greater 
legal tooth was endorsed. The deadline on the Union government to set up the Tribunal within 
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a year of the complaint was accepted as was the recommendation that the Tribunal’s award be 
given the same force as an order or decree of the Supreme Court. Deadlines were also set for 
the Tribunal to give its report and for the report to be implemented, but enough flexibility was 
built into the clauses to allow for political and other contingencies.6 
Since the enactment of the relevant law in 1956, the Tribunals have emerged as institutions 
that can play an important technical and judicial role in inter-state river water disputes. They 
have demonstrated the technical expertise required to evaluate the contributions of the 
catchment areas of individual states to the river. They have also shown the judicial skill required 
to determine how the water should then be shared. But the acceptance of their verdict is an 
issue that they evidently believe is well beyond their purview. 
‘Externalities’ and Water Disputes 
While looking at popular responses to an inter-state water dispute it is important to recognize 
that the public perception of the issues involved need not tally directly with the legal issues 
involved. River water disputes do not occur in isolation but, within a larger social, economic and 
political context. In a purely legal sense, we could treat many of these issues as external to the 
dispute, or what economists would call ‘externalities’. But that does not necessarily diminish 
their importance. Indeed, in the popular perception, what is typically being debated is the 
entire set of issues that can be directly or indirectly related to the specific water dispute and 
not just the technical aspects that is the focus of the Tribunals. And this broader debate could 
be influenced by a variety of factors. 
The intensity of water disputes tend to be very sensitive to popular perceptions of shortages. 
The disputes can, and often do, arise well before a shortage actually emerges. The moment 
conditions arise that raise the possibility of change in the demand for water, states tend to 
make their claims. The dispute over Cauvery waters first arose in the late nineteenth century 
when a significant proportion of the water was flowing into the sea. But, as the states move 
towards utilising a greater proportion of the water, there is the possibility of canals going dry in 
a bad monsoon year. It is the fear of such extreme shortages that adds to the intensity of public 
reactions to the dispute in a poor monsoon year. 
This sensitivity to the monsoons is also heightened by the pressures to build irrigation 
infrastructure based on excessively optimistic estimates of rainfall. Given the often vast 
differences between conditions in wet land and dry land villages, it could make economic sense 
to construct irrigation infrastructure even if it is expected to go dry, say, once in every four 
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years. But in the dry year, there will be a tendency to look suspiciously at other users of the 
river water, especially if they are in another part of the country. 
The frequency of such dry years would depend not just on the monsoons but also on the 
efficiency of the irrigation network. The wastage involved in extremely low levels of efficiency 
could lead to canals going dry even in years of only a limited decline in rainfall. And there are 
several factors that contribute to this wastage. The demands of rural politics ensure that the 
pricing of irrigation water is such that it is difficult to even cover maintenance costs. There is 
then little possibility of charging anywhere near the scarcity prices needed to prevent the 
wastage of irrigation water. The challenge of putting in place a pricing system in the urban 
areas that prevents wastage is also largely unaddressed. In addition, cities are also marked by 
grossly inadequate attention being paid to the need to differentiate water quality for different 
uses. More often than not, drinking water is used for gardens. 
The effect of the rising probability of the canals going dry has been accentuated by larger macro 
economic trends. The rapid growth in the Indian economy since liberalization in the 1990s has 
been marked by a sharp decline in the share of agriculture from well over 40 percent of Gross 
National Product to well below 20 percent of GDP. At the same time, there is little to suggest a 
corresponding shift in the workforce from agriculture to non-agriculture. While the census 
noted a fairly sharp decline in the proportion of agricultural labourers and cultivators to total 
workers in a few states like Kerala, this trend was far less pronounced in most other parts of the 
country.7 If we take into account the overall growth in population, the number of people 
dependent on agriculture has, in fact, grown very substantially. Indian agriculture thus presents 
a picture of a larger number of people dependent on a lower share of GDP. Efforts to ease this 
pressure are constrained by the fact that the net sown area in India has not grown significantly 
since the 1960s (Bhalla and Singh, 1997). The entire emphasis then is on cropping the same 
piece of land more frequently. And irrigation forms an essential part of this dream. 
To make matters worse, there are indications of an increasing dependence on river waters. 
Other more local sources of water are already under intense pressure. The centuries-old tank 
irrigation network is, in most parts of India, in a state of extreme disrepair, leading to a massive 
decline in the area irrigated by tanks.8 In urban areas, there is an economic incentive to hasten 
the decline of this water source, as tank beds can be converted into expensive real estates. The 
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unregulated use of groundwater has also resulted in the gross over-utilization of this source 
(Singh and Singh, 2002). Not surprisingly, the dependence of cities on river waters has also 
increased. Chennai has had the benefit of an agreement between neighbouring states, giving it 
additional water from the Krishna. Bangalore’s dependence on the Cauvery for its water has 
also grown quite rapidly. 
These water-related pressures have been given an additional dimension by national political 
trends. The 1980s can be seen as one of the turning points in the emergence of regional 
identities in Indian politics. It was marked by the rise of a variety of regional movements across 
the country from Punjab to Assam and down to the southern states. The nature and intensity of 
these movements did vary quite substantially – from secessionist terrorism in Punjab to greater 
assertiveness within the Indian union in states like Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. It was 
perhaps only to be expected that this trend would have its effects on river water disputes as 
well. It may not be entirely coincidental that the decades after 1980 have seen states being less 
willing to accept the verdict of Tribunals. The challenges of sharing the water of individual rivers 
too have tended to be increasingly articulated in inter-state terms. In rivers like the Cauvery, 
disputes over water sharing could occur just as easily within as well as between states. One of 
the major disputes over sharing the waters of this river in the 1970s was over the Varuna canal, 
which saw a clash of interests between farmers of two districts in Karnataka.9 But since the 
1980s, the focus has been entirely on the sharing of waters between states. And disputes 
between linguistically defined states provide a prominent place for language and linguistic 
identities. The response in Karnataka to issues related to the sharing of Cauvery waters is not 
confined just to the basin but extends to Bangalore. And in Bangalore, the agitations are 
typically dominated by the same groups that lead language and identity based politics in the 
state.10  
It is important to note that the impact of such external factors on water disputes and the 
Tribunals set up to address them need be uniform. The factors involved would themselves vary 
from situation to situation. Language, for instance, would tend to play a far more potent role in 
disputes between states that have a history of language tensions than in conflicts between 
states where such tensions do not exist. Much would also depend on the response to public 
discontent. One of the reasons why tempers on the Cauvery dispute did not reach the levels 
they had in 1991, in the following years, was the fact that the governments, both in Delhi as 
well as in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, chose not to take a purely legalistic approach to the issue 
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and force the awards on an unwilling population. Indeed, even the Supreme Court has been 
wary of insisting on an immediate implementation of the Cauvery Tribunal’s final order, 
regardless of the social tensions on the ground. The nature and impact of external factors on 
the functioning of a Tribunal would then need to be understood on a case by case basis. 
Putting the Tribunal in Context 
The divergence between the two dimensions of the Rawlsian concept of institutions is clearly 
quite substantial in the case of Water Dispute Tribunals in India. The technical aspects of the 
disputes, such as the rights of individual states to the water and the principles to be used in 
apportionment, are complex enough. But when we enter the realm of reactions to the dispute, 
a number of other equally complex, and frequently much more intangible, elements enter the 
picture. The links to identity politics in particular have sometimes led to situations that are very 
volatile. The considerable distance between the technicalities of water sharing and the 
aggressive postures on the street of identity politics makes it rather difficult for practitioners in 
one to relate to the other. It is tempting for the technical experts to simply hope that the 
central government will demonstrate the strength to make the pressures of identity politics 
irrelevant. Such expectations are however based on a gross underestimation of the very real 
link between an essential requirement like water and identity politics. 
In order to understand this link, we need to make explicit the distinction between the river 
basin and the territory covered by the users of the river water. The boundaries of the river 
basin are determined by the catchments of the river. The usage of the water from the river can 
extend beyond the basin. In a relatively backward agrarian economy that does not have the 
ability to divert river waters for irrigation, the two territories may be broadly the same. But 
technology can substantially change this situation. Large storage dams and irrigation networks 
can take the water to fields outside the basin. Large scale urbanisation outside the basin can 
also add to the demand for river water. Rapid industrialisation outside the basin too can create 
a fresh source of demand for the water. To the extent that we consider urbanization and the 
development of non-agrarian economies as essential features of development, we can expect 
that over time, the divergence between the boundaries of the river basin and that of the 
territories that use the river water will only grow. 
The non-basin users of the water, in turn, represent very diverse interests, which can generate 
their own conflicts over water. The demands of water-intensive industries would have to be 
balanced against the drinking water needs of the population. The need to provide free drinking 
water to the poor can lead to higher prices for water being paid by the non-poor. The political 
mobilization of these groups requires them to be brought under a common umbrella. Language 
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and regional identities provide large umbrellas. Thus, as long as there are diverse groups 
outside the basin that share a common interest in water, there will be a temptation to link the 
politics of water to that of identity. 
Inter-state river water disputes are thus a reflection of a larger set of tensions thrown up by 
changing relationships in a number of areas. A meaningful effort to resolve the conflict would 
then require a multi-dimensional approach. Such an inclusive approach would address at least 
three important aspects of the issue. 
First, it would recognize the divergence between a river basin and the areas utilizing the waters 
of that river. It would be prepared for the possibility that economic development will shift an 
increasing portion of the water from the basin to areas outside the basin. This shift need not be 
confined to what is made possible by large irrigation projects. It could also be the result of 
increasing non-agrarian uses of river waters. This shift will have to be managed in a way that is 
consistent with the availability of water. A crucial element in such a management strategy 
would be water pricing that reflects the scarcity of this resource as well as other priorities such 
as the provision of drinking water to all and the need to ensure sufficient water for the 
production of food crops. 
Second, an effort would have to be made to ease the existing pressures on water. A variety of 
steps would be needed to improve the efficiency of water usage, ranging from the prevention 
of wastage to ensuring that scarce drinking water is not used where reusable water would 
suffice. The problem of a greater number of people than required being dependent on a unit of 
land, and irrigation water, would also have to be addressed. The availability of alternative 
occupations will help reduce the dependence on irrigated agriculture for a livelihood.  
Third, it must be recognized that, notwithstanding the fact that there are a large number of 
dimensions to water issues, Tribunals have a critical role to play in the resolution of inter-state 
disputes. Much as we have emphasized the need to be comprehensive in the approach to 
water issues, it does not, in any way, diminish the importance of at least two roles that the 
Tribunals play.  
First, a significant degree of legal knowledge is required when determining the principles to be 
used when apportioning river waters. This knowledge is unlikely to be available outside the 
judiciary. Since a Tribunal, by law, consists only of senior members of the judiciary, it is 
equipped to handle this task. There may still be the odd error in the functioning of a Tribunal. It 
could be argued that the failure of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal to include a distress 
sharing formula in its interim order was a major error. It meant the upper riparian state had to 
bear the entire burden of a failure of a monsoon. But given the complexity of the issues 
www.sawasjournal.org Volume 2 | Issue 1 
 
The Place of the Tribunal in Inter-State Water Disputes 47 
 
involved, it is only to be expected that the possibility of legal errors is less when the exercise is 
carried out by members of the judiciary.  
Second, the Tribunal has the ability to investigate the specifics of each river basin with a degree 
of independence and detail that would be beyond the scope of other judicial institutions. It is 
unlikely that other institutions, including the Supreme Court, would have the time to go into a 
specific river water dispute with the same degree of detail as a Tribunal that has years to do so. 
The Tribunal is thus, in a unique position to merge technical knowledge with judicial 
experience. 
The effectiveness of a Tribunal can also be enhanced if its structure can be modified in a way 
that allows it to address at least some of the factors that are currently considered to be outside 
its purview. In the current arrangement, there is no reason why a Tribunal, looking only at the 
technical and judicial aspects of a dispute, must come up with solutions that are acceptable to 
state governments that are sensitive to the political dimensions of that dispute. One way to 
bridge the gap between Tribunals and state governments would then be to allow place for a 
wider set of interests within the Tribunal. A Tribunal could first identify the major stakeholders 
in the dispute and then go on to co-opt representatives of each stakeholder. The solutions 
offered by such a broader Tribunal may not still be the same as those demanded by an elected 
state government. But to the extent that the Tribunal would now be looking beyond the 
technical and judicial aspects alone, the gap between its view and that of an elected 
government is likely to be narrower. 
To answer the question we started out with, the Tribunals have an essential role to play in 
addressing the technical and judicial aspects of inter-state river water disputes. But there are 
other dimensions to these disputes that are equally important to address which fall well 
beyond the capabilities of even the best equipped Tribunal. The effectiveness of a Tribunal 
would then depend not just on what it does, but also on what is done to address factors 
beyond its control. 
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